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Abstract—Security is an important facet of integrated circuit 
design for many applications. IP privacy and Trojan insertion are 
growing threats as circuit fabrication in advanced nodes almost 
inevitably relies on untrusted foundries. A proposed solution is 
Split-Chip Obfuscation that uses a combination trusted and 
untrusted IC fabrication scheme. By utilizing two CMOS 
processes, a system is endowed with the stronger security 
guaranties of a trusted legacy node while also leveraging the 
performance and density of an advanced untrusted node. Critical 
to the effectiveness of Split-Chip Obfuscation is finding an 
optimum partitioning of a system between the two ICs. In this 
paper, we develop a design flow for the Split-Chip Obfuscation 
scheme, defining the essential system metrics and creating a tool to 
rapidly assess the large design space. We demonstrate the concept 
of such a tool and show its application on an example SoC.  
Keywords—Trusted design; Design automation; Security in 
hardware; Obfuscation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Due to increasing costs associated with IC (integrated 
circuit) technology scaling, the set of companies that 
manufacture third-party designs in state-of-the-art CMOS nodes 
has been reduced to a small number of internationally run 
foundries. In tandem, demonstrable security issues in the 
commercial space suggest that designs that require paramount 
security should not be fabricated in untrusted foundries [1]. Once 
a design is submitted for manufacture, the foundry is able to 
modify functionality by inserting Trojans or leak the design to 
third parties. Notable attempts to secure the manufacturing 
process include Logic-Locking, Programmable Logic, and Split-
Manufacturing [2-4]. Each of these solutions increases security, 
but also has associated shortcomings.  
Logic Locking obfuscates a circuit’s functionality by adding 
keyed elements to a circuit. After manufacture, the designer 
enables the circuit by programing the key in an on-chip tamper-
proof memory. The true functionality is not exposed to the 
foundry, hindering targeted Trojan insertion and IP leakage. 
Logic Locking however suffers from a metric problem wherein 
the security is quantified with heuristics [5]. Additionally, SAT-
based attacks have been able to de-obfuscate locked designs. 
Programmable Logic has been used to withhold all or large 
portions of a design from the manufacturer. While this technique 
effectively obfuscates the design, it is associated with a large 
performance overhead, incompatible with some application 
requirements. Another technique, Split-Manufacturing splits a 
design into front- and back-end-of line parts. Each part is 
manufactured in a separate foundry and subsequently combined 
by a trusted entity. Thus, barring collusion, neither foundry has 
full access to the design. This is a potent solution but requires 
navigating complicated logistics between foundries.  
An alternative approach to ensure a secure manufacturing 
process is Split-Chip Obfuscation, which utilizes a mixed 
fabrication scheme to provide combined security and 
performance that none of the aforementioned techniques can 
match. This obfuscation technique is targeted at systems with 
security constraints that justify the cost of a second IC. Fig. 1 
depicts the Split-Chip Obfuscation flow. The original system is 
split between trusted and untrusted ICs. The trusted IC is 
manufactured in a controlled setting where strict oversight can 
verify that no are Trojans inserted and the design information is 
secure. The trusted IC will likely use a low cost, legacy node that 
is certifiably secure, thereby significantly impacting the 
performance, area, and power for that chip. Conversely, the 
untrusted IC is manufactured in a state-of-the-art node, but at an 
assumed adversarial foundry.  
The system components are divided between the ICs 
depending on their respective security and performance 
constraints. Modules that are both security and performance 
critical can be placed on the untrusted chip with secondary 
obfuscation techniques. The trusted IC will most likely contain 
the system control and IP that is security critical, whereas the 
untrusted IC will serve as a computational farm, containing 
performance and power critical components. This dual IC 
paradigm affords the overall system with strong security DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A.  Approved for public release: 
distribution is unlimited.  
Fig. 1. Diagram of Split-Chip Obfuscation’s dual foundry manufacturing. 
Performance and security critical IP are respectively place on the untrusted and 
trusted ICs. IP that is critical in both domains can be added to the untrusted IC 
with additional obfuscation.  
guarantees while maintaining performance.  
 Ideally, the two technologies nodes utilized in Spit-Chip 
allow for a system that achieves a trusted foundry’s security 
while maintaining the performance of the untrusted foundry. 
However, in practice this is unlikely to be the case. The 
application of Split-Chip to an SoC requires careful planning on 
the part of the system engineer. The hard security guarantees do 
not come free. This integration process consists of partitioning 
the design between the two ICs such that the vulnerability to the 
untrusted foundry is minimized while still respecting the 
application dependent constraints. In using an older technology 
for a portion of the design, there will necessarily be a loss in both 
the system’s power and area. Some trusted circuitry will be 
limited in its maximum frequency, which can reduce system 
throughput. Perhaps most impactful is the new communication 
bottleneck introduced between the two ICs. The system engineer 
must now consider all these additional effects while maximizing 
security within the bounds of the system constraints.  
II. SPLIT-CHIP PARTITIONING TOOL 
As discussed in the previous section, the security benefits of 
Split-Chip are reliant on the intelligent integration of the trusted 
IC into a system. For simple systems, this process may be 
feasible by hand, but when extended to complex, heterogeneous 
systems, finding an optimal solution is intractable without 
automation. The number of possible partitions grows 
exponentially with the number of modules in the design and 
interactions between multiple interdependent metrics will not be 
immediately obvious to a designer. To assist a system designer 
in applying Split-Chip Obfuscation, we have developed a Split-
Chip Partitioning tool (SCP) which builds a system model and 
quickly assesses the design space, finding the most secure yet 
feasible module partitioning. Additionally, the tool is able to add 
secondary obfuscation techniques to further secure the design. 
SCP gives a system engineer a flexible high-level interface to 
both integrate and evaluate Split-Chip Obfuscation in a system.   
The SCP program flow consists of the following three steps: 
A.  System Characterization:  
SCP begins with system characterization, a onetime 
preprocessing step in which the parameters for the system model 
are determined. SCP targets the integration of Split-Chip 
Obfuscation into a System-on-Chip (SoC) design consisting of a 
set of functional modules connected with a Network on Chip 
(NoC), a paradigm pervasive in modern IC design. While the 
exact topology of the network may vary, we assume that internal 
module metrics are independent from the inter-module 
connections. As input to the characterization, the user specifies 
the RTL and connectivity of each module from the original SoC. 
The tool begins with an automated synthesis of each module in 
both the trusted and untrusted technology nodes. An iterative 
process is used to find the maximum frequency. Starting from 
zero, the clock period of each module is relaxed until the 
synthesis tool is able to converge on a solution that meets timing. 
The critical path slack is used to determine the next target clock 
period. This step produces netlists for each module in the trusted 
and untrusted configurations.  
 After synthesis, the untrusted module netlists are locked with 
secondary obfuscation, producing more possible module 
configurations. The locked netlists are again optimized by the 
synthesis tool to resize any modified gates. Currently, two forms 
of logic locking are applied: Key Logic, which uses keyed XOR 
gates to invert signals within the circuit [2], and FSM 
obfuscation, which adds decoy states to the circuit’s FSM [4].  
 After this stage, each module has an associated netlist for 
four configurations: Trusted IC, Untrusted IC, Untrusted IC with 
Key Logic, and Untrusted IC with FSM Obfuscation. The 
resulting netlists are used to produce values for area, dynamic 
power, and static power at max frequency for each module 
configuration. These values then parameterize, the system 
model, a set of functions that produce metrics for a given system 
configuration which consists of a configuration assignment for 
each of the modules.  While the time to synthesize each module 
in both technologies is high, this upfront overhead allows quick 
assessment and optimization in the later stages of the flow. 
B.  Constraint Specification:  
 The system model consists of metrics for clock domain 
frequency, power, I/O bandwidth, I/O latency, and area. These 
metrics collectively capture the aspects of the system essential 
to adding Split-Chip Obfuscation. Each metric is constrained to 
a value determined by the user. Additionally, the user can 
specify hard placement constraints that fix a module to a given 
configuration. Constraint specification begins by assessing the 
initial space of possible configurations with the constraints set to 
the original SoC values. From this point, the constraints are 
iteratively relaxed, allowing modules to move from the untrusted 
IC to more secure configurations. This process continues until 
the user is satisfied with the resulting partitioning. In the 
remainder of the section, we discuss how each of these metrics 
 
Fig. 2. Diagram of the Split-Chip Obfuscation flow with trusted entities in green and untrusted in red. The original SoC is split into two designs which are each 
produced using a standard IC flow. The designs are fabricated in separate foundries and integrated into a dual-chip, dual-trust SoC. The Split-Chip Partitioning Tool, 
the focus of this work, is highlighted in blue. 
is calculated.  
 Clock Domain Frequency: Typical SoCs are divided into 
multiple clock domains, linking sets of modules to the same 
frequency. This paradigm is replicated in SCP. For each clock 
domain, the user specifies a set of constituent modules and a 
minimum domain frequency. The clock domain frequency is 
calculated in two steps. First, the maximum frequency of each 
module in the domain is determined by the module’s 
configuration.  Next, the clock domain frequency is determined 
by the minimum of the module frequencies. Each module in the 
group is then run at this frequency.  
 Power: The next metric, power, builds upon the previously 
determined clock domain frequency. In the initial system 
characterization, the power at maximum frequency is found. 
However, in the final system, each module will not necessarily 
be run at this maximum. Thus, in order to estimate a module’s 
power consumption at a given frequency, we scale the 
characterized dynamic power by the ratio between the module’s 
maximum frequency and its clock domain frequency. While this 
estimate does not exactly correspond to what is obtained by 
resynthesizing the module with a new target frequency, it does 
give a close, and conservative estimate. This scaled dynamic 
power is added to the module’s static power and contributions 
from each module are then totaled. The user is able to constrain 
the total system power as well the power for each individual IC.  
 I/O Bandwidth: Splitting an SoC between two ICs will 
inherently increase the total I/O bandwidth utilized by the 
system. Already in a single IC system, I/O bandwidth can be a 
critical bottleneck, limiting system throughput to the bandwidth 
provided by the specific I/O technology. In a Split-Chip system, 
the hard upper bound on I/O bandwidth must now include chip-
to-chip communications that previously used an NoC, clearly 
making this a first order constraint. To model the system’s I/O 
bandwidth, we create a graph representing the system, an 
example of which is shown in Fig. 3. Each module corresponds 
to a node with weighted edges representing the inter-module 
bandwidths. For each system configuration, we find the edges 
that are routed between the trusted and untrusted chips and sum 
their respective weights. This value is constrained to the 
maximum system I/O bandwidth. 
 I/O Latency: In addition to I/O bandwidth, the latency of off-
chip connections must be considered. Any inter-module 
connection routed off-chip will now have to account for this 
delay. While some paths are expected to be indifferent to this 
latency change, others will have meet external, application 
dependent constraints. Similar to bandwidth, we use a graph 
representation to capture the latency requirements. The modules 
are represented as nodes and latencies between them are the 
edges. For any edge that is routed off-chip we increase the 
latency by the expected inter-chip delay. As shown in Fig. 3, 
these edge latencies are then constrained with user specified 
maximum latencies. We also allow the user to specify 
constraints that span multiple edges enabling more expressive 
security constraints. 
 Area: Area is an important metric depending on the system’s 
application. We ensure that the total area of the configuration is 
less than the constraint specified. Similar to power, a module’s 
area will change with its clock speed due to additional buffering 
requirements. This change is relatively small compared to the 
overall module area so we make the assumption that area 
remains constant with period. 
C. Vulnerability Optimization:  
 With the system model and constraints set, the user runs an 
optimization to find the most secure feasible system 
configuration. This process is naturally formulated as a discrete 
optimization problem, wherein each module is assigned one of 
four states: Trusted IC, Untrusted IC, Untrusted IC with Key 
Logic, or Untrusted IC with FSM Obfuscation.  To weigh the 
relative securities of a given system configuration, we introduce 
a new metric, vulnerability. A higher vulnerability corresponds 
to a less secure system, thus the optimization will minimize 
vulnerability subject to the constraints. Vulnerability consists of 
the product of two user-specfied components: exposure and 
criticality.  
 Exposure assesses the risk associated with a module being in 
a particular configuration. The term represents the module’s 
exposure to Trojan insertion or IP theft. We give the trusted chip 
a low exposure meaning the adversarial foundry does not have 
access to the modules. Meanwhile the untrusted chip is given an 
Fig. 3. Depiction of the graph representation used for constraining I/O 
bandwidth and latency. The boundary between ICs is shown with the red dashed 
line.  
Fig. 4. Example criticality specification used in demonstrating SCP on an 
example SoC. The user uses criticality to rank the security importance of each 
module in the system. 
exposure of 1, following the assumption that the adversarial  
foundry has complete access. The secondary obfuscation 
techniques are given exposures close to 1 with their relative 
rankings determined by the designer’s regard for each. The 
second vulnerability component, criticality, specifies the relative 
importance of the modules. Security critical modules are 
designated with a high criticality which will puch the 
optimization to prefer putting these modules in more secure 
configurations. In Fig. 4, we show the criticalities used for an 
example SoC.  
 We stress the use of vulnerability as not a security guarantee, 
but simply a way to rank the various system configurations. 
Split-Chip’s security still relies on the single hard guarantee of 
the foundry not having access to the trusted IC’s netlist. 
Vulnerability is simply a metric that maximizes the use of this 
hard guarantee. 
 As previously mentioned, the space of possible system 
configurations scales exponentially with the number of modules 
in the design. Fortunately, the optimization problem solved by 
SCP has structure that makes it a good candidate for branch and 
bound optimization, allowing large systems to be solved 
quickly. Unlike a brute force approach, the branch and bound 
paradigm utilizes information from previous evaluations to 
eliminate portions of the search space. The branch and bound 
optimizer recursively considers sets of solutions, ruling out 
subsets based on a bounding function. The optimizer starts with 
the set of all solutions, in this case all possible module 
configurations. This set is divided into subsets by branching, 
recursively assigning modules to a given configuration. At each 
branch, the partial solution is evaluated. Because the metrics 
considered by our tool are additive, if the partition solution does 
not satisfy the constraints or produces a higher vulnerability than 
any known full solution, the subset of configurations in the 
branch is ruled out. This property allows the branch and bound 
paradigm to effectively prune the search space, greatly reducing 
the run time. 
 After the optimization is run, the results are displayed to the 
user as depicted in Fig. 7. Depending on the resulting 
vulnerability score, the user can accept the results or continue 
exploring the space by modifying the constraints. This process 
can be easily parallelized allowing quick parameter sweeps to 
assess the available tradeoffs.  
III. SOC DEMONSTRATION 
To demonstrate the efficacy of SCP, we use it on an example 
SoC, the block diagram of which is displayed in Fig. 5. The 
system contains a total of 16 modules divided into four clock 
domains. The first domain contains a GPS system, which 
functions as the performance critical portion of the design. The 
six modules in this domain are interconnected with high 
bandwidth connections and expected to perform close to the 
nominal untrusted system. The next domain contains a set of 
cryptographic accelerators. An OpenRISC microprocessor and 
memory makes up the next domain. The microprocessor 
functions as the system’s glue logic containing connections to 
all modules in the design and thus has relatively high 
performance constraints. Finally, the last domain contains I/O 
and test modules with relaxed security and performance 
constraints.  
For the trusted and untrusted technologies, we respectively 
utilize 45nm and 16nm standard cell libraries. In Fig. 6, the 
results of the system characterization are displayed. The 
minimum period, area, and a normalized power value are shown 
for each module. As expected, across all modules there is a 
significant gap between the trusted and untrusted technology 
nodes. The two obfuscation techniques show similar average 
overheads, but the cheaper technique depends on the module. 
Even for a relatively simple system such as this, the wide range 
in results shows the complexity of partitioning a system by hand. 
Fig. 7. displays four runs from a parameter sweep on our 
example system. The first two runs just use the trusted and 
untrusted configurations, whereas the third and fourth runs allow 
Fig. 5. Block diagram of example SoC with modules grouped by 
clock domain. 
Fig. 6. System characterization results for each configuration for each module from the example 
SoC. Each module configuration is highlighted in a different color. 
secondary obfuscation to be added to the system. Displayed for 
each run are a subset of the system metrics, corresponding 
constraints, and partitioning diagram of the optimal solution.  
In run 0, the system constraints have been held at the original 
SoC values. As a result, the tool is unable to find a secure 
solution. The only configuration that matches the constraints is 
all modules being placed on the untrusted IC. This run 
establishes a baseline vulnerability score that the user can 
compare to the subsequent results. In run 1, several constraints 
are relaxed namely the period of the accelerator clock domain, 
the total system power, and GPS system latency. This allows 
modules to be moved to the trusted IC, significantly reducing the 
system vulnerability. We see that the optimal solution moves 
several security critical modules to the trusted IC. In run 2, 
Logic-Locking and FSM obfuscation are enabled with the same 
relaxed constraints as the previous run. The result is a further 
reduction of the vulnerability from this secondary obfuscation. 
Finally in run 3, a small additional constraint relaxation on the 
CPU clock domain period, allows all modules in the system to 
have some form of obfuscation. While only a few iterations are 
shown, the user can continue this process to explore other 
potential tradeoffs.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Split-Chip Obfuscation shows great promise as a method of 
securely manufacturing low-volume ICs. However, to realize the 
potential benefits, careful attention must be payed to partitioning 
the system. To enable this process on complex designs we have 
developed SCP, which demonstrates how a powerful automation 
framework can explore the vast design space.   
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Fig. 7. Graphical interface of the Split-Chip Partitioning Tool, showing four runs from a constraint sweep. Each run shows a bar plot of the user-specified constraints 
and corresponding metrics for the optimized system. The vulnerability of each run is shown on the same plot with its axis in red. To the right, the partioning is 
displayed with the modules colored based on their configuration.  
